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THOUGHTS ON PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
By NICHOLAS J. BUA*t
INTRODUCTION

As a part of the judicial process, pretrial discovery must
serve the ultimate purposes of justice. Whatever makes the
process more just ought to be fostered; whatever reduces the
quality of the justice must be eliminated. Whatever rightfully
serves those who advocate and administer justice serves justice.
These statements are clich6s. But they are cliches because they
How fundamental precepts are
are fundamental precepts.
adapted to practice, and how practice gives rise to problems is
the life of the law. It is with one aspect of the practice of law,
problems of pretrial discovery, that this paper is concerned.
It states some questions which concern the practitioner in pretrial discovery. There is no attempt herein to resolve all of the
problems implicit in the practical exigencies of pretrial discovery.' But there are some suggestions of ways by which the practitioner may find solutions. Ultimately, of course, the answers
will come from the Illinois courts of review. This article is not
directed to the practitioner who regularly appears before a pretrial motion court. It is too fundamental for him. The article is
offered to and intended for the practitioner who has occasion to
practice before a pretrial motion court.
The fact that there are so many unanswered questions in
the area of pretrial discovery is an annoyance to a practicing bar
nurtured on the common law tradition of case law precedent. It
is simultaneously, however, an acknowledgment of the Illinois
Supreme Court's fulfillment of the constitutional mandate given
it in 1962 to formulate rules for modern practice. Insofar as
discovery procedures are concerned, the goal of the court is simplification: i.e., the number of instances in which justice demands
appeal, the court has sought to simplify pretrial procedure.
Delay is a regrettable by-product of appeal, for it may deprive
a party of some of the benefits of justice. On the other hand,
quick determination of appeals is not an aid to justice if speed
* Nicholas J. Bua, Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.
t Judge Bua wishes to thank senior student Thomas Hunter for his assistance in the research, preparation and development of this article.
'One of the practical aids to the practitioner in Illinois in the application of the pre-trial rules of discovery is INSTITUTE ON CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE ILLINOIS BAR, ILLINOIS CML PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL (1967).
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in the determination results in increased appellate errors. Simplification in the furtherance of justice, insofar as simplification
reduces the number of cases which must be appealed, is highly
desirable. The economic feasibility of appeal is itself a factor
that weighs strongly on the side of simplification. The officers
of the court must be most vigilant to see justice done when the
chances of appeal are slight.
The goal of the new discovery rules is to further perfect the
judicial process as a truth-seeking process. Justice is often
effectively denied by those who act honestly but without full
knowledge of relevant facts. Justice can be denied either by
refusing a litigant the chance to discover relevant facts or by
permitting a litigant to embarrass or harass his opponent
through unnecessary discovery.
The question of the scope of discovery requires discussion
of several derivative issues. It must include the factors which
limit its scope. The limitations of work product, attorney-client
privilege, and unfairness (a limitation evolving in Illinois) must
be included. Discussion of the attorney-client privilege must
include questions attendant to defining the scope of the attorneycorporate client privilege. In this area recent federal cases
offer a somewhat persuasive rationale by which the practitioner
may determine whether the privilege is applicable to the facts
of his particular case. Another problem area, experts' reports,
is a topic open to speculation. Recent Illinois decisions force
even the most conservative forecaster to assert that significant
changes will occur when the questions come properly before the
Illinois courts of review.
Appending this article are interrogatory and production
order forms that have been approved by the Law Motion Judges
for use by attorneys involved in personal injury actions in the
Circuit Court of Cook County. Proper use of the forms materially aids in the efficient and effective use of pretrial discovery.
If used correctly, the forms increase the probability that all
relevant facts will be presented to the court. Certainly they
increase the efficiency of the court. The questions have been
carefully drafted to both enable their use in diverse factual
situations and to avoid the common pitfalls of form interrogatories.
THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY

In order for information to be subject to discovery it must
be relevant in an evidentiary sense 2 or lead to information which
2 Stimpert v. Abdnour, 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962). The thrust
of the court's holding was that if the material sought for discovery was independently admissible at trial, such material was discoverable.
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is so relevant. 3 The rule is easily stated; but it is not easy to
apply. It is extremely difficult to delineate the scope of relevancy
in a discovery sense. For example, delineation begins with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201:
Except as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery
full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim
or defense of the party seeking disclosure or of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or tangible things, and the identity
and
4
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
But this rule reflects the latest case law on the scope of pretrial
discovery; and an understanding of that case law is necessary
to an understanding of the rule.
Procedurally, the movant has the burden of showing that
the material sought to be discovered is relevant in a discovery
sense.5 His opponent has the burden of showing that a privilege
6
or exemption applies to the material sought for discovery. Of
course, the relevancy may be apparent from the face of the
pleadings. Such would be the case when the material sought to
be discovered is relevant in an evidentiary sense. However, when
the matter sought to be discovered only leads to matter admissible at trial, the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that (at
the trial judge's discretion) relevancy for discovery purposes
T
can "be determined by a judicious use of interrogatories.
A significant aid in determining what is properly discovera3See Krupp v.Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.
2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d
532, 535 (1956), where the court said, " 'Discovery before trial' presupposes
a range of relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible at the
trial."
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (b) (1) (1969).
5 In Reske v. Klein, 33 Ill. App. 2d 302, 179 N.E.2d 415 (1961), the appellate court held that the party seeking discovery through interrogatories
could not shift his burden of showing relevancy by asking the questions in
such form as to require the interrogated party to make a conclusion as to
what was relevant.
6 The burden of the asserter of a privilege was most recently shown
in Golminas v. Fred Teitlebaum Constr. Co., 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251 N.E.2d
314 (1969). Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 132 N.E.2d
532 (1956). In re Estate of Wahl, 218 Ill.
App. 295 (1920).
People ex rel. Gen. Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 194, 226 N.E.2d 6, 14
(1967). The proper form of interrogatories to effect discovery of those who
know relevant facts has been the subject of several recent Illinois decisions.
While ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(e) (1969) provides: "[Ulpon request
made at any time before the trial, a party must furnish the identity and location of persons, in addition to those previously disclosed, having knowledge
of relevant facts." (emphasis added). Such language may have been misleading to the litigant in Reske v. Klein, 33 Ill. App. 2d 302, 179 N.E.2d 415
(1961). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order excusing the defendant from answering plaintiff's interrogatory No. 5 which read: "'State
the names and addresses of all persons who have knowledge of the relevant
facts involving the occurrence narrated in plaintiffs' complaint."' Id. at 305,
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ble is an accurate view of the purposes supporting discovery. The
Illinois Supreme Court has pointed out that unsuccessful arguments as to the limitations on discovery indicate a failure to
understand the purposes of discovery. In People ex rel. Terry
v. Fisher,8 the court held that the plaintiff in a personal injury
case was entitled to discover the amount of liability insurance
which the defendant had at the time of the accident. The
court rejected the defendant-appellant's argument based upon
179 N.E.2d at 417. (emphasis added). The court held that the interrogatory
was improper for it required the defendant to draw a conclusion as to what
was relevant. Such burden of the interrogating party could not be shifted to
the other party by the form of the question. The court then suggested that
a proper form would be: "State any matter, not privileged, relating to the
merits of the matter in litigation." Id. at 306, 179 N.E.2d at 417. The
court gave as a guideline: "The language of the rule should not be so employed verbatim, but rather should be considered as delineating the area
within which interrogatories can be framed." Id. at 306, 179 N.E.2d at 417.
Another form of an interrogatory which has been approved by the Illinois courts of review was one used in a personal injury action arising out of
an automobile accident. The interrogatory was, [ls]tate the name and last
known resident address of each person having knowledge of the facts alleged
in the complaint filed herein . . . ." Frozen Food Express v. Modern Truck
Lines, 79 Il. App. 2d 84, 91, 223 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1967).
Another case illustrating the pitfalls in which the interrogator can
most easily fall is Grant v. Paluch, 61 Ill. App. 2d 247, 210 N.E.2d 35 (1965).
In this case the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's
judgment on the verdict for the defendants in a dram shop action.
The court held that the trial court judge should have allowed plaintiff's
rebuttal witness to testify over the objection of the defendant who contended
that the witness was not named in answer to the defendants' interrogatory
asking for occurrence witnesses. The interrogatories in question took two
forms. One form was substantially the same as the objectionable form in
the Reske case. The court accordingly held that the plaintiff could not be
denied the opportunity to call this witness based upon the objection he made.
The other form of the interrogatory was so drafted as to exclude the witness
from a proper order. The court held, it seems, that the witness could testify
without objection from the defendant as to those matters which the witness
observed, except those matters which would have properly required him to be
included in the answer to the interrogatory.
When the interrogating party improperly phrases the question and the
interrogated party does not accept the shift of burden by answering the
questions fully, the interrogating party does not have grounds to exclude
the testimony of the occurrence witness called to the stand during the trial
by the interrogated party who did not include the witness' name in the answer
to the interrogatory. Fedors v. O'Brien, 39 Ill. App. 2d 407, 188 N.E.2d 739
(1963). Accord, Nelson v. Pals, 51 Ill. App. 2d 269, 201 N.E.2d 187 (1964).
The effect of the Nelson and Fedors cases is consistent with the additional
burden placed upon the interrogating party in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, §213(c) (1969), which puts the burden of calling the objection to the
attention of the court on the party propounding the interrogatory. If the
form of the question was such as to invalidly attempt to pass the burden to
the interrogated party, and to compound the interrogator's inadvertence he
fails to object to the answer, the interrogator's objection to the calling of
that witness at trial will not be heard. The intention of the interrogated
party is immaterial in deciding the question. In Nelson the omission of the
name of the witness was unintentional, while in Reske the interrogated party
intentionally refused to answer the improper interrogatory.
The interrogator is put in a difficult position. He may propound an
improper interrogatory and not know that he has failed to account for all
the witnesses until they are called at trial when he cannot object to their
surprise testimony. To avoid this situation the interrogatories reported in
the Appendix of this article contain an interrogatory covering this question.
8 12 Ill.
2d 231, 237, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957).
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Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19-4' that what was discoverable
must be relevant, and that what was relevant referred only to
"'isolated legal concepts such as negligence, proximate cause,
and damages, divorced from the realities of litigation .... Y 1Y10
In Saunders v. Schultz," the court applied the rationale of
the Fisher case by denying the defendant's request through interrogatories for the existence and extent of the plaintiff's hospital
and medical insurance. The distinction between Fisher and
Saunders is that in Fisher the defendant's insurance existed for
the benefit of the public, whereas in Saunders the plaintiff's
insurance existed for the benefit of the plaintiff. Probably the
broad scope of Monier would require that the plaintiff's hospital
and medical policy was discoverable because it could lead to discovery of impeachment evidence with respect to damages or
injuries.
What constitutes relevance "to the subject matter involved
in the pending action" 12 may be said to be that which relates to
the subject matter of the litigation, and also that which serves
the purposes of pretrial discovery. But it is hard to conceive of
this case being support for the argument that a motion which
seeks pretrial discovery of material should be sustained solely
because the material would aid in settlement (unless such material is relevant to the issues or leads to material that is relevant
to the issues). The reader is encouraged in his conclusion that
the Terry court was vigilant to find relevancy in a discovery
sense,1 3 although the finding of relevancy was further supported
by settlement argument. It has been suggested that the purposes
of discovery are three :14 (1) to increase the probability of obtaining a fair decision on the merits of the litigation ;15 (2) to
preserve testimony which would be unavailable at the time of
trial;16 and (3) to encourage settlements prior to trial.

7

It is

9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19.4(1) (1956), which stated:
Upon a discovery deposition, the deponent may be examined regarding
any matter, not privileged, relating to the merits of the matters in litigation, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any documents or tangible things and
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
The material is now covered in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (1969).
10 People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236-37, 145 N.E.2d 588,
592 (1957).
1120 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
12 See note 5 supra.

Is People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 239, 145 N.E.2d 588,
593 (1957).
14 Johnston Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J.
PRAc. & PRoc. 2 (1968).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
B. J. 480

at 26.
at 29.
at 29.
(1967).

See Watson, The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL.
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assumed that if the discovery sought is relevant in a discovery
sense then it will disclose facts which will increase the probability of a fair trial. The second purpose serves the first. If the
testimony of a person who has knowledge of relevant facts is
preserved, then the chances of a fair determination of the controversy is increased.
The settlement by-product of broad discovery rules seems
to be an important consideration taken into account by Illinois
courts in determining whether a particular document or interrogatory is sufficiently "relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action""' to require the court to order discovery.
The weight of the settlement theory in Illinois courts, and its
persuasive effect upon the courts, can be seen in Monier v. Chamberlain.'9 After the Illinois Supreme Court restated both the
definition of discovery relevancy from Krupp v. Chicago Transit
Authority20 and the purpose of discovery from People ex rel.
Terry v. Fisher,21 it added:
Additionally, the increasing complexity and volume of present-day
litigation involves frequent recourse to discovery procedures, and
to unduly limit their scope would serve only to inhibit pretrial
settlements, increase the burden of already crowded court calendars, and
thwart the efficient and expeditious administration of
22
justice.
Approximately one month after Monier Justice Underwood gave
a further insight to the settlement theory in pretrial discovery:
Discovery procedures, if properly employed, ought to facilitate
settlements by enabling the parties to more accurately estimate
the strengths and weaknesses of their positions. Should such
cases still proceed to trial, the additional knowledge 2afforded by
adequate pretrial discovery should expedite the trial. "
While no reported Illinois case has allowed discovery when such
motion was supported only by a showing that the material would
aid in settlement, two points should be considered. First, as
was shown in Terry, even when the relation between the subject
matter of the pending action and the material sought to be discovered is remote, the court is inclined to grant the discovery
motion when the information will increase the probability of
pretrial settlement within the spirit of the rules. Secondly,
although the issue is still in grave doubt, strong arguments can
18 See note 5 supra.
19 35 Ill.
2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).

20 8 Ill. 2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
21 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236-37, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957).
22

Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 357, 221 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1966).

28 Justice Underwood, An Address to the Eastern Division of Local Bar

Associations Annual Meeting at Danville, Ill., on Oct. 26, 1966, CH. DAILY
LAw BULL. (1966).
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be made supporting a right to discovery based upon the settle24
ment theory alone.
Not all the commentators agree that the settlement theory
fulfills the purposes of pretrial discovery.25 One commentator
proposed:
[N]otwithstanding the court's claim to the contrary it seems inescapable that the broad discovery suggested in the Monier opinion
will impede26rather than promote "the ultimate ascertainment of
the truth.

The argument made is that an unscrupulous attorney can compensate for the impeaching effect of testimony and evidence held
by his adversary after discovery of such testimony and evidence.
As to the settlement theory expressed in Monier the commentator
accepts its rationale with some reservation. He finally argues
that:
[t]he most important factor in the making of settlements is the
fear of unknown evidence in the possession of one's opponent. If
plaintiff's counsel does not know whether or not the defense has
knowledge of prior injuries or surveillance moving pictures or if
either side does not know the contents of statements given to the
opponent by his own witnesses, the mutual fear of these unknown
factors creates a greater desire to settle than is present if each
party already knows exactly what the other side's evidence will
27
be and has had the opportunity to prepare his case accordingly.

It is doubtful that a settlement based upon fear was the type of
settlement which prompted the Illinois courts to espouse the
24 Comment, Developments in the Law -

Discovery, 74 HA.v. L. REV.

940 (1961). Note that when this comment is referring to "Work Product"
it is obviously using such term in a pre-Monier definition.
The reasons underlying work-product protection are largely oriented
to maintaining the efficacy of preparation for litigation. However, discovery may be sought not to prepare for trial but as a basis for settlement. Since the parties will usually wait until they are thoroughly
familiar with the facts - perhaps not until after the pretrial conference - to consider settlement, impeding the exchange of information
would appear to delay such consideration. When this is so, it may be
questioned whether work-product should apply.
Since in such circumstances each party will be more eager to let the
other know the strength of his case, it seems less likely that either would
wait and see what the other had turned up. Moreover, the desire that
his strong points be disclosed should prompt each to record at once the
fruits of his discovery. Furthermore, if one lawyer does acquire informal or oral information, subjecting him to deposition would entail
no danger of subsequent disruption of trial proceedings. In similar fashion, discoverability of legal and factual contentions should be welcomed
by each party, since each would be anxious to indicate to the other the
reaches of his case. Because pleadings and introduction of evidence
would not determine the issues to be resolved, the maintenance
of a flexible pretrial position would be unnecessary. Further, since the
person to be convinced would be an opponent rather than an independent
trier, preservation of surprise or spontaneity would be of a minimal
value.
Id. at 1043.
25 Watson, The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL. B. J. 480, 486

(1967).
26 Id. at 487.

27 Id. at 489-90.
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settlement theory. A strong argument could be made that the
purpose of the discovery rules as expressed in the settlement
theory does not attempt to effectuate a settlement in every case,
or at any price to justice. The cases support the argument that
the discovery rules should be used to effectuate a just settlement; as a consequence, the rules should be used to discourage
unjust settlements based upon ignorance of the facts.
[W]e are mindful of the obligations of this court to give these
discovery rules an interpretation consistent with their avowed
purpose. They were adopted as procedural tools to effectuate the
prompt and just disposition of litigation, by educating the parties
in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and de-

fenses ....

28

Another facet of the argument holding that broad discovery
into matters which leads to evidence admissible at trial, and
in particular impeachment evidence, frustrates the ultimate purpose of pretrial discovery is that discovery of such evidence
permits the opponent to reshape29his argument to mollify the
value of the impeaching evidence.
The assumption here is that the reshaping process results
from facts previously outside of the attorney's knowledge, or
worse, the so-called manufacturing of evidence. When such unscrupulous reshaping does occur it must be severly condemned.
However, when the reshaping process by counsel is within the
scope of the facts as the attorney knows those facts, and in a
manner most favorable to his client, the attorney is doing nothing more than fulfilling his obligations both to his client and to
the court.30
Commentators favoring a more complete pretrial disclosure
argue:
While conceding that promoting settlements is desirable because it helps to effectuate the dispatch of court business, the main
thrust of the argument from Monier critics is aimed at pretrial
discovery of alleged impeachment evidence concerning other injuries and surveillance movies. The critics contend that by broadening the scope of discovery in Illinois, Monier approves techniques
which have the effect of frustrating the ultimate asceiainment of
the truth. They fail to understand that Monier intends to expose
grossly prejudicial impeaching evidence before it is injected into
a trial, rather than after its introduction, when courts are unable
to eradicate its ill effect on juries and are forced to grant new
trials.31
This argument rejects the historical "sporting theory" of litiga28 People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236, 145 N.E.2d at 59293 (1957).
29 Id.
30 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 7. This Canon is entitled,
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law, and deals with the ethical considerations and sanctions in this area.
31 Phillips, Anti-Monierism, 55 ILL. B. J. 920 (1967).
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tion. The system of discovery which provides for the disclosure
of impeaching evidence decreases the backlog by preventing
mistrials and retrials when such highly prejudicial matter is
32
improperly injected into the trial for the first time.
A closely related problem to relevancy in pretrial discovery
is that of specificity in the discovery of documents. 33 Rule 214
provides in part:
At any time after the commencement of an action any party
may move for an order directing any other party or person to
produce for inspection, copying, reproduction, and photographing
specified documents, objects, or tangible things . . . 8. 4 On the
hearing the court may make any order that may be just.
While the degree of specificity is not defined in the rules, the
3 5
held that the
Illinois Supreme Court in Monier v. Chamberlain
specificity requirement was one of a reasonable description. The
court added:
What will suffice as a reasonable description may well vary from
case to case depending on the circumstances of each, but we believe
that designation by category ordinarily is sufficient for these purposes.8 6

This rule was apparently modified the next year in General
Motors v. Bua31 The Illinois Supreme Court in the General
Motors case held that there must be a showing of relevancy in
a discovery sense when relevancy is not apparent from the face
of the pleadings. The case also showed, however, that pretrial
38
interrogatories may be used to make the discovery more specific
when the materials sought to be discovered are voluminous, and
there is a danger of revealing trade secrets, and the relevancy
does not appear from the pleadings.
The Monier court gave two guidelines for specificity. A
reasonable description is necessary: (1) to allow the party from
whom discovery is sought to know what is demanded; and (2) to
aid the court in determining whether the requested material is
exempt from discovery.3 9 The latter purpose may be an aid to
the court in determining whether the party against whom the
discovery is sought is in contempt of court for failure to obey a
court order.
32 Id.
33

See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 1134 (1949).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A §214 (1967) (emphasis added).
35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
Id. at 356, 221 N.E.2d at 414 (1966) (emphasis added).
People ex rel. Gen. Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 173, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
38 See also, Bourne v. Seal, 53 Ill. App. 2d 155, 203 N.E.2d 12 (1964),
where the court held that a motion to produce from an insurer of all insured
persons, all disbursements, and all premium payments for several years
was too broad.
39 See, Note, 56 ILL. B. J. 520, 522 (1968), citing, Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 356, 221 N.E.2d 410, 414 (1966).
34
35
36
37
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LIMITATIONS ON DISCOVERY

Not all material which is relevant to the subject matter of
the litigation and specified sufficiently in the production order is
discoverable. The supreme court rules provide for full disclosure "[e]xcept as provided in these rules.""40 Within that
caveat there are three areas of excluded material:- 1 (1) the
work-product of the attorney ;42 (2) the privileged communication ;43 and (3) such attempted discovery which would give rise
to a "protective order of court. ' ' 4 In Illinois the work-product
of an attorney was defined in Monier v. Chamberlain:
We believe that only those memoranda, reports or documents which
reflect the employment of the attorney's legal expertise, those

"which reveal the shaping process by which the attorney has arranged the available evidence for use in trial as dictated by his
training and experience," may properly be said to be "made in
preparation for trial . . . . ,
The court exemplified the general rule:
Thus, memoranda made by counsel of his impression of a prospective witness, as distinguished from verbatim statements of such
witness, trial brief, documents revealing a particular marshalling
of the evidentiary facts for presentment at the trial, and similar
documents which reveal the attorney's "mental processes" in shaping his theory of his client's cause, are documents "made in
preparation for a trial . . . . 7
While the Illinois Supreme Court in Monier was following the
lead provided by the federal court in Hickman v. Taylor,4 the
Illinois court narrowed the definition from the federal court and
effectively eliminated the "good cause" requirement allowing the
discoverer the right to invade the work-product exemption."
ch. 110A, §201(b) (1) (1969).
4'See, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §214 (1969), wherein the statute pro40 ILL. REV. STAT.

vides, "On the hearing the court may make any order that may be just."
(emphasis
added).
42
1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (b) (1) (1969).
Id.
44
1d. at §§201 (c) (1), 214.
4535 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
46 Id. at 359-60, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
4Id. at 360, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
48329 U.S. 495 (1947).

49 Prior to the express denial of the good cause requirement in Monier,
a commentator had concluded that the Illinois Appellate Court in Day v.
Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964), had included good-cause in Illinois discovery procedure. "IT]he Appellate Court
appeared to be taking judicial notice of a 'good cause' factor ... despite the
fact that [the rules] contained no such 'good cause' provision." Watson,
The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL. B. J. 480, 484 (1967).
Further comment on the good cause element in the Day case can be
found in Kaye, Discovery Brought Up To Date, 54 ILL. B. J. 396, 398-99
(1966), where the author comments that three months after the appellate
court filed their opinion in the Day case the same court held almost precisely
to the contrary in Jost v. Hill, 51 Ill. App. 2d 430, 201 N.E.2d 468 (1964).
There had been an express rejection of the good cause requirement in the
First District Appellate Court since 1956 in the decision of Eizerman v.
Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956).
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Comparison of Monier with Hickman reveals similarity. Both
courts drew three concentric circles of discoverability. Within
the outer circle is all relevant material pertaining to the subject
matter of the pending action. Both Illinois and federal courts
provide for discovery of this material. Within the middle circle
would be matter prepared by the attorney in preparation for
trial, but not matter disclosing the mental impressions of the
attorneys or their trial strategy. The latter would be subject to
discovery because of the work-product definition in Monier. Although such material would be subject to a work-product defense
in the federal courts it could be discovered upon the showing of
necessity or "good cause." 50 Finally, within the inner circle
would be the opinions and mental impressions of the attorney.
In both the federal and Illinois courts such material would be
absolutely exempt.5 '
The second limitation upon full discovery is the attorney52
client privilege. It will be discussed below.
The third area which gives rise to a limitation upon discovery involves the concept of fairness. 52 Because it has been
defined inconsistently, this concept is difficult to work with. It
has been construed to mean the inequity of allowing one party
to bear the burden of the expense of the initial discovery while
his opponent secures the same information by discovery for
free.54 If this situation seems unfair the resolution of it may be
contained in the rules. "The court may apportion the cost involved in originally securing and in furnishing the discoverable
material, including when appropriate a reasonable attorney's
fee, in such manner as is just."5
Fairness can be used in a larger sense. For example, it has
been asserted that:
[t]he broad scope of discovery gives rise to the possibility
that its erroneous employment may result in substantial harm.
50 See, Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN MAR.
J. PRAC. & PRoc. 22, 45-48 (1968).
51 "[I]n Hickman the court has established an absolute exemption for all

such 'work product' that would reveal the opinions or mental impressions of
adversary's counsel."

Id. at 43.

But see 43 F.R.D. 221, 225 which Mr.

Johnston says would seem to eliminate the absolute exemption.

In Monier the court directly rejected the good cause requirement:
We have considered the propriety of requiring under the Illinois discovery practice ...that "good cause" be shown before otherwise properly
discoverable material, or material ordinarily protected from discovery
under a broader "work product" doctrine than the one adopted here,
need be disclosed. We have concluded that the attendant problems

which arise under the "good cause" doctrine render adoption of that
theory undesirable. 85 Ill. 2d 351, 360, 221 N.E. 2d 410, 417 (1966).
5 See text at note 66 infra.
53See note 43 supra.

54Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J.

PRc.
& PRoc. 22 31 (1968).
55

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (b) (1) (1969).
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Moreover in some situations, the ordinary process of appeal from
a judgment finally disposing of an action is an inadequate redress.
Thus reversal will not restore the secrecy of a trade secret or
process once disclosed, and in many instances the fruits of distrial at all and will not inject
covery will not enter into the
56
error into the final judgment.

It is at this point that a sense of fairness invokes the power
of the court to enter a protective order.57
If an attorney feels that the court wrongfully refused to
enter a protective order limiting or denying a motion for an
order of discovery against his client, his redress is probably
appeal from the order finding him in contempt for failure to
comply with the discovery order.
The only certain method of obtaining review of interlocutory orders concerning discovery by refusing to obey the order and
the propriety of the order is
appealing a judgment of contempt;
5
open to question on appeal. 8

Absent a contempt order Illinois case law holds that interlocutory orders directing or denying discovery are not generally
appealable. 9 There is one alternative procedure. A petition in

mandamus may be filed in the supreme court.60 Review of the
While the court in General
discovery order is discretionary.Motors said that the "extraordinary writ of mandamus is a

valuable judicial tool which must be considered even though
some of the normal criteria for its use are absent,"-- the court
warned that "ordinarily original mandamus or prohibition is an
'63
inappropriate remedy to regulate discovery in the trial court.
Significantly, the court added, "we wish to give no encouragenormal pretrial
ment to the litigant who would have us review
' 64
discovery procedure by original mandamus.
E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE,
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(c) (1) (1969).
56

§1.22 (2d ed. 1963).

58 Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959) ; see also
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966); Stimpert v.
Abdnour, 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962); Hill v. Thomas B. Jeffery
Co., 292 Ill. 490, 127 N.E. 124 (1920); Hawley Prod. Co. v. May, 314 Ill.
App. 537, 41 N.E.2d 769 (1942).
59 Galler v. Galler, 24 Ill. App. 2d 183, 164 N.E.2d 526 (1960).
60 People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780
(1957). This use of the mandamus writ was also used in People ex rel.
Terry v.Fisher. The question of the discoverability of liability insurance
in personal injury cases was decided by a writ of mandamus, People ex rel.
Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957). In People ex rel.
522, 74 N.E.2d 865 (1942) the question of whether
Prince v. Graber, 397 Ill.
a nonresident is required to answer oral interrogatories in Illinois was
brought by a writ of mandamus. In People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10
Ill. 2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 788 (1957), the right of a defendant to compel a
physical examination of the plaintiff in a personal injury action was established by an original writ of mandamus.
61 People ex rel. Hoagland v. Streeper, 12 Ill. 2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625
(1957).
62 People ex rel. Gen. Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 192, 226 N.E.2d 6, 13
(1967).
63 Id. at 191-92, 226 N.E.2d at 13 (1967).
64 Id. at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 14 (1967).
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Perhaps there is a fourth area of limitation upon the production of relevant documents. This would be the specificity
requirement discussed above. 65 The court should properly deny
a motion for production of documents when the motion seeks
66
matter which is too broad in scope.
THE ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE

67

There are several traditional categories of privilege."
construction each may be shown to comply with:

By

[f1our fundamental conditions . . . recognized as necessary to the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications:
(1)
The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2)
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the
parties.
(3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
The injury that would inure to the relation by the dis(4)
closure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
9
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.6

These conditions have been acknowledged by the Illinois courts
70
of review.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,71 Judge
Wyzanski used a particular set of criteria to establish the attorney-corporate client privilege for the corporation:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or
65 See text at notes 26-30 supra.
66 Id.
67 It
is axiomatic that what is protected is not the relevant fact but its
communication. The party seeking discovery will be unable to take depositions from either the attorney or the client as to what the client told the
attorney. However, if the client in the civil action knows relevant facts
to the action he can be ordered by court to subject himself to any of the
truth-seeking processes of discovery.
68 Wigmore lists and divides privilege into three major categories: (1)
privilege from attending, (2) privilege from testifying, and (3) sundry
rules. Privilege from testifying is divided into three subdivisions: (a) in
general, (b) privileged topics, (c) privileged communications. Privileged
communications is divided into among other things the major privileges,
which are: attorney-client, marital relationship, physician,patient, priest and
penitent. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2190-224, 2290-329, and 2332-340, 2380rhereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
391, 2394-396 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL, Rule 440 (1963), lists in addition to
the above categories the accountant-client privilege. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
51, §§5, 5.1, 5.2 (1969).
69 8 WIGMORE, §2285. For a detailed analysis see §§2294-2329.
70 Monier v. Chamberlain, 66 Ill. App. 2d 472, 485, 213 N.E.2d 425, 433
(1966), aff'd 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966). The appellate court in
Monier cites to a probate claims contest Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 II1. 492,
153 N.E. 740 (1926), where the court recited the Wigmore criteria applicable
to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 500-01, 153 N.E. at 743.
7 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
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his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal service or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the 2privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.1
The rationale supporting the privilege is simple. An attorney
could not adequately give advice to his client, nor properly prepare cases for trial if he could not know whether he possessed
the full and complete facts. Unless the privilege extended,
clients would be hesitant to give their attorneys any facts that
did not present their case favorably. If they were to make
a complete disclosure the attorney could be compelled to disclose
the communication.73 In short the system of justice would be
destroyed and people would be forced to their own resources
before the bench. In order to avoid the potential danger of the
failure to disclose relevant facts while hiding them under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege, "[c]ourts and commentators have sought to draw a line which would permit protec' ' 74
tion only when it accords with the rationale of the privilege.
What the court is doing when it decides the breadth of the
attorney-corporate client privilege is quoted by the Illinois court
in Day v. Illinois Power Co.:
[B]alancing the competing goals of the free and unobstructed
search for the truth with the right and absolute necessity for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to
gain the legal advice sought thereby, the courts will realize that
they are not dealing with a blanket privilege ....75
This should be kept in mind by the practitioner who finds himself
in a new factual situation in the area of a corporate client privilege which has not come before the Illinois courts for review.
In 1964 the Illinois Appellate Court answered for state purposes a question which had been raised two years earlier. In
1962 Judge Campbell announced in Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Association,7 that there was no precedent hold72 Id. at 358-59.
The requirement set forth by Judge Wyzanski appears
to be well established in lIllinois law. S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL,
Rules 433-38 (1963), provides for an excellent source of case law on the
points.
See generally, E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE, §§10, 13-10.18
(2d ed. 1963).
7 See generally, 3 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §1345 (2d ed.
1944); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §181 (1954); 8 WIGMORE §§2290-91.
74 Freidenthal, Discovery and Use of Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 457 (1962), citing, Simon,The Attorney-Client
Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 953, 955-56 (1956).
7550 Ill. App. 2d 52, 57, 199 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1964) ; quoting from Radiant Burners v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 324 (1963).
76 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
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ing that the attorney-client privilege applied to the corporate
client. He accordingly held that the corporation was not entitled
to the privilege. This decision was ultimately reversed. In the
words of one commentator:
"[T]he attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to
corporations." The court of appeals thus resolved the doubts
raised a few months earlied by Judge Campbell's District Court
decision in the same case - doubts which 7prior to Judge Campbell's
opinion had occurred to almost no one.7
In 1964 the question came before the Illinois Appellate
Court. In Day v. Illinois Power Co.71 the defendant-utility company's gas pipe exploded damaging the property and person of
the plaintiff. The company had retained the attorney on a permanent basis. At the attorney's direction and supervision, the
employees of the defendant corporation examined the scene of
the accident and made a direct report to the corporate attorney.
The plaintiff sought discovery of the reports. To the argument
that the reports were privileged the court noted: "The fact
that the Illinois Power Co. is a corporation is immaterial for
it is entitled to the same treatment under the law as any other
'client' - no more and no less.1 7 "No more" looks to the control-group limitation placed upon corporations, "no less" looks
to the district court decision of Judge Campbell in the Radiant
Burners case. The court stated, "[iut is our considered judgment that based on history, principle, precedent and public policy
the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to
corporations, and we so hold."'80 The court's use of the phrase
"in its broad sense"8 1 signaled the qualification most commonly
referred to as the control-group limitation which was expressly
adopted in Illinois in Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Construction
Co. 813 In defining just which employees of the corporation are
within this group the court drew heavily on City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. :14
If an employee or investigator making reports to an attorney for
the corporation is in a position to control or take a part in a
decision about any action the corporation might take upon the
advice of its attorney, he personifies the corporation and when he
77 Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B. J.
542-43 (1968), citing, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d
314, 322, 324 (1963).
78 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
79 Id. at 55, 199 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1964).
80 Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 56, 199 N.E.2d 802, 805
(1964).
81 Id. at 56, 199 N.E.2d at 805 (1964).
82 Id.
But see, Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56
ILL. B. J. 542 (1968).
83 Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Constr. Co., 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251
N.E.2d 314 (1969).
84 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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makes reports or gives information to the attorney, the attorneyclient privilege applies. Such employee must have actual authority,
85
not apparent authority, to participate in a contemplated decision.
The court held that if nothing in the record showed that the
employees were members of the control-group as defined by the
court, it would deny the privilege.s" Once the court could say
that the privilege did not exist, then it could find that the material sought should be discovered.
In Day the defendant-appellant (corporation) argued both
work-product and the attorney-client privilege. While the appellant's argument is labeled as a work-product argument, the
court refers at times to communications between the "source
agents 8 T of the corporation and the attorney. These communications were made while the attorney was retained by the corporation and pursuant to his direction and supervision. The
reports were made directly to him, and not to any other member
of the corporation. The appellants had argued that:
[A]Ill reports with regard to same and investigations of said claim
were made to the affiant as attorney for said defendant and that
the same are privileged as part of the work product
between
8

attorney and client and are not subject to discovery.1
The court resolved the problem by invoking a rule broad enough
to cover both work-product and the attorney-client privilege.
The Day court adopted the policy of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the Radiant Burners case. The Illinois
Appellate Court declined to give a guideline opinion on the
question of breadth of the privilege.8 9 There is one exception.
The court adopted the Radiant Burners' warning that the privilege would not be extended so as to allow a corporation to
"funnel" its papers into the files of their corporate counsel and
thereby avoid all disclosureY°
The question of the attorney-corporate client in the federal
courts may soon be tested in the United States Supreme Court.
A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Harper & Row v. Decker Publishers, Inc.,91 is being appealed by the
plaintiff/co-respondent.12 The decision of the court of appeals is
85 Day v. Illinois Power Co 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 58, 199 N.E.2d 802, 806
(1964). For an application of ie same rule, see Garrison v. General Motors
Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (D. Cal. 1963).
86 See In re Estate of Wahl, 218 Ill. App. 295 (1920), which establishes
that the burden of proving the privilege is on the party asserting the privilege.
87 See generally Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 YALE L. REv.
953 (1956). A "source agent" is defined as "one who is himself the source
of the information being disclosed or forwarded." Id. at 956.
88 Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 54-55, 199 N.E.2d 802,
804 (1964).
89 Id. at 57, 199 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1964).
90 Id.
91 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
02 United States Supreme Court docket No. 1337.
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significant for our purpose for it creates a broader privilege
for the corporate client than that created by the "control group"
test. The corporate employees had testified before a federal
grand jury investigating the publishing industry. After their
testimony was taken by the grand jury the employees were
"debriefed" by the corporate counsel. The plaintiffs in the case
sought to discover the memoranda made as a record of the debriefing sessions. The court held that while the employees were
not within the "control group" as defined by Judge Kirkpatrick
in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse93 and followed in other
cases,9 4 their statements would be held privileged. The court in
Decker stated:
[t]hat the control group test is not wholly adequate, that the corporation's attorney-client privilege protects communications of
some corporate agents who are not within the control group, and
that in those instances where the order here under attack must rest
entirely upon the control group test, the order is unlawful.
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his
communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where
the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon
which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt
with in the communication is the performance by the employee of
the duties of his employment.9 5
The court distinguished the employees in this case from the type
of employee whose communication is indistinguishable from that
of a bystander, and expressly declined to express an opinion on
the privileged character of the communication of a bystanding
corporate employee.
The test used by the court has two requirements: (1) the
communication made by the employee apparently must be made
at the direction of employee's supervisor; and, (2) the subject
matter of the communication made by the employee is within
the realm of the duties of employment for the employee. The
immediate effect of this test which becomes apparent is that it
includes within the shelter of the attorney-client privilege many
more corporate employees than the "control group" test includes, as heretofore applied in either the federal courts or the
Illinois courts. 96 If the new test becomes the law in the federal
courts then the future cases might probably have to decide how
express must the supervisor's direction be.
93 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
94 See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (D. Cal. 1963).
95 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970).
96 See text at notes 78-86 supra.
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The problems of the attorney-corporate client privilege does
not end with the definition of the group. The profession was put
on notice of other problems which would arise in the area when
the Illinois Appellate Court followed the lead of Radiant Burners in declining to give a guideline opinion. One question arises
from the practice of a corporation employing attorneys as "house
counsel." Bryson P. Burnham comments:
[A] lawyer in the law department of a large corporation may, in
fact, do more strictly legal work than a partner in a big-city law
firm; but located at the corporation's office and paid directly by the
corporation, the inside counsel starts looking more like a businessman and, as a result, finds it harder to convince a court that in
particular instances he was acting as a lawyer.9 7
The problem looks to the factual aspect of requirement
"(2) (b)"91 in Judge Wyzanski's opinion in the United case;""
that is, for the privilege to apply, the communication has to be
made to him while he was acting as an attorney.00 While the
exact issue has not been presented to the Illinois courts for consideration, Judge Wyzanski's analysis, reported in the United
case' 01 was:
[t]he apparent factual differences between these house counsel and
outside counsel are that the former are paid annual salaries, occupy
offices in the corporation's buildings, and are employees rather than
independent contractors. These are not sufficient differences to
distinguish the two
types of counsel for purposes of the attorneyo2
client privilege.1
Apparently, the problem in the "house counsel" situation is how
to delineate the appropriate facts to which the law is to be applied. The distinction between when the attorney is functioning
as an attorney and when he is functioning as a businessman is
difficult to determine even when the occurrence facts are squarely
before the court.
The problem invoked by the presence of "house counsel"
on the case requires consideration of two questions:
(1)
whether the privilege can be invoked to protect counsel's opinion
of mixed business and legal advice; and (2) whether it is significant in the application of the privilege to "house counsel"
that the counsel be admitted to practice before the local bar.
The modern "house counsel" is "more than a predicter of
9, Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B. J. 542,

543 (1968).
98 See text at note 72 supra.
99 See note 71 supra.

100 Illinois cases support the requirement that the communication to be
privileged must be made to the attorney while the attorney was acting in
his professional capacity. See In re Estate of Wahl, 218 Ill. App. 295
(1920) ; McCloud v. Hogle, 200 11. App. 483 (1916) ; Potter v. Barringer,
236 Ill. 224, 86 N.E. 223 (1908) ; Goltra v. Wolcott, 14 Ill. 89 (1852).
101 See note 71 supra.
102 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
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legal consequences,"'' 0 3 but perhaps less than what David Simon
has suggested, "[y] our modern corporate lawyer is a member of
the command staff of a corporation.. . It's like the organization
1
of an army. We like to think of the legal division as G-2. 10
Where the line should be drawn has not been determined in the
federal court; nor has the question been resolved in the Illinois
courts. Judge Wyzanski has commented:
[I]t is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard himself
as more than predicter of legal consequences. His duty to society
as well as to his client involves many relevant social, economic,
political and philosophical considerations.105
This is a reasonable statement of the duty of an attorney. But
it does not necessarily follow that all that is within the scope
of his duty is privileged against disclosure. In general, the
communication in question should be tested against the guidelines set forth in the earlier part of this section. Consider together: Judge Wyzanski's analysis of "house counsel," 10 6 his

statement of the lawyer's duty,107 and couple it with the general

rule that totally non-legal advice is not privileged. 10 8 Then consider Judge Wyzanski's statement that, "[t] he privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communication which also includes
legal advice."'0 9 The practitioner will deduce that a balance must
be made between pure legal opinions and pure business opinions.
Precise weights for decisions have not been determined.
Commentators have offered several suggestions for how a
"house counsel" should be maintained in order to keep the privilege. 110 Included in the suggestions are: (1) separate stationery
with the legal title of the attorney signing the letter; (2) legal
files separate from corporate records; and (3) a specific indication in the letter or memorandum that the signator is rendering
a legal opinion. While application of these suggestions would be
helpful to a judge, the admonition of the Day court must be kept
in mind. "Certainly, the privilege would never be available to
allow a corporation to funnel its papers and documents into the
hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby avoid
10 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.
Mass. 1950).
104 Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 YALE L. REV. 953, 969
(1956), quoting The Wall Street Lawyers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan., 1956,

at 31, 35.
105 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.
Mass. 1950).
106 See text at notes 80, 82 supra.
107 See note 84 supra.
os See generally S. GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL, Rule 434 (1963).

L09 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.
Mass. 1950),
110 Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. B. J.

542, 543-44 (1968).
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disclosure .

. . ."I"

It appears obvious that the same thinking

would apply where the court was faced with non-legal opinions
tendered by counsel to the corporation under the guise of a legal
opinion.
The second question raised is whether the "house counsel's"
admission to the local bar is a dominant factor in deciding if the
privilege exists. The problem illustrated by United was:
Thirteen other persons in the [patent] department are not members of the bar of this Court or of the courts of this Commonwealth
but are members of other judicial bars. The fact that they, though
resident in Massachusetts and regularly working here, have never
received a license to practice law here shows that these regular
employees are not acting as attorneys for United. (The situation
would be different with regard to a visiting attorney from
another
1 12
state, for whom the privilege might well be invoked.)
Two commentators have felt that this statement in the opinion
was make-weight. 113 There exists enough concern about the
problem to raise comment among the authorities. Wigmore's
comment is:
There is no ground for encouraging the relation of client and
legal adviser except when the adviser is one who has been formally
admitted to the office of attorney or counselor as duly qualified to

give legal advice.
That the person consulted is in fact practicing
without formal
1 14
sanction of the court, is certainly not sufficient.
In the Model Code of Evidencelll the definition of "lawyer" in
the privilege is:
[a] person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized, to practice law in any state or nation the law of which
recognizes a privilege against disclosure of confidential communications between client and lawyer ....

16

If the United court had adopted this definition, the result of the
ruling as to the thirteen attorneys licensed in another state
111 Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 57, 199 N.E.2d 802, 805
(1964), quoting Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,

324 (7th Cir. 1963).
112 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.
Mass. 1950).
113 Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege as It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B. J. 376, 379 (1965), where the quotation is made,
Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe excluded from the privilege all correspondence to and from persons in the patent department who were
graduate lawyers but who were not admitted to the practice of law in
the state where they were employed. However, I believe that the recital of this fact was a mere make-weight in the decision, since lawyers
in the patent department supposedly would give legal advice on the
United States patent law, not on local Massachusetts law.
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE
L. RuV. 953 (1956), wherein the author states: "Judge Wyzanski was probably using the lack of local admission as little more than a make-weight." Id.
at 972.
114 8 WIGMORE, §2300.
115

MODEL CODE

116

Id. rule 209.

OF

EVIDENCE

(1942).
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might well have been different.'- Perhaps the concern does not
come from United but from the language used in American Cyanamid v. Hercules Powder Company."8 After noting that the
attorney in question was admitted into practice in the District
of Columbia, but not in the state in which he was practicing, the
court said: "This fact alone does not conclusively demonstrate
that Peverill was not acting as an attorney, but it is highly
119
probative of the fact."
One proposed solution to the difficulties of applying the attorney-corporate client privilege involves the classification of
corporate employees into three groups of agents: managing
agents, communicating agents, and source agents.2 0 A managing agent is defined as "one who has authority to undertake
action or make decisions in regard to dealings with corporate
counsel.' 121 This classification is not unlike the control-group
theory announced in the Day case. 22 "A communicating agent
is one who simply forwards information.' 23 "A source agent
is one who is himself the source of the information being disclosed or forwarded." 12 4 This is similar to what has actually
occurred in the courts.
For example, consider the following situations: the corporation, through one of its employees, may relate to the corporate attorney facts giving rise to or directly relating to litigation. The corporation through one of its officers, directors,
or managers may seek advice as to pending or future litigation.
The corporation through any employee may seek non-legal advice
from the corporate attorney. A communication may be transmitted through the agent of either the corporation's employee
or the attorney's employee. Information may be transmitted
through the insurer of the corporation to the attorney selected
by the insurer to represent the corporation. Or, information
may be transmitted to the corporate attorney by an employee, not
a member of the "control-group," who is or may be a defendant
in the case.
In the first and second situations the use of the attorney17

See text at 84 supra.

118 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).

119 American Cyanamide Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85,
89 (D. Del. 1962). This court declined to use the approach of Judge Wyzanski in the United case wherein the court adopts a test for extending the
privilege to "house counsel" determinate upon the percentage of time which
the attorney spends upon legal activities.
120 Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,65
YALE L. REV. 953 (1956).
121 Id. at 963.
122 Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
123 Simon, The Attorney-Client P7ivilege as Applied to Corporations,
65 YAm L. REV. 954, 963 (1956).
124

See note 70 supra.
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client privilege is contingent upon whether the corporate employee is a member of the control-group of the corporation.
If an employee or investigator making reports to an attorney for
the corporation is in a position to control or take a part in a decision about any action the corporation might take upon the advice
of its attorney, he personifies the corporation and when he makes
reports or gives information to the attorney, the attorney-client
privilege applies. Such employee must have actual authority, not
apparent authority, to participate in the contemplated decision.1 25
A communication to an attorney which otherwise would be
privileged is not so privileged if made in the presence of a third
person, or if communicated to a third person. Once the privilege
is waived, it is waived forever. There are exceptions to this
general rule. When the communication is made through what
David Simon would call a "communication agent" (a secretary
27
or messenger) ,126 the privilege is not destroyed.1
In applying the privilege to a communication between the
attorney and his client in which the attorney gives non-legal
advice, courts are attempting to define a balance which will
protect the legal opinion even though there is some non-legal
advice in the communication.
In Illinois there is solid authority in People v. Ryan1 8 for
asserting that the communication is not lost when retained
within the privileged group. Ryan and Day effect a quantity
of rules which provide helpful guidelines to attorneys in this
area. Read in conjunction, Ryan and Day would support the
rule that an attorney-corporate client privilege is not lost if the
corporation which had communicated with its attorney were to
acquiesce in a transmission of the communication from the corporate insurer to an attorney selected by the insurer to defend
the corporation. Further, the privilege is not lost if the corporation through its "house counsel" or other counsel were to
request a copy of the communication to be retransmitted to
another counsel in order to prepare for litigation. In Ryan the
12 9
second litigation arose from the same set of facts as the first.
Whether the second transmission must be to an attorney who is
defending an action arising out of the same facts has not been
125

Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 58, 199 N.E.2d 802, 806

(1964).
128 See generally 8 Wigmore, §2317; 10
14 STAN.
12 7 L. REV. 455, 457 (1962).

STAN.

L.

REv.

297, 304-5 (1958);

Wigmore says: "[i]t has never been questioned that the privilege
protects communication to the attorney's clerks and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his services." 8 WIMORE, §2301.
128 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
129 In the Ryan case the client was defended in the civil action arising
out of an automobile accident by an attorney selected by her insurer. The
second transmission of the communication was to a different attorney by the
insurer.

The second attorney was by her own choosing for her defense in a

criminal action arising out of the same occurrence.
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presented to the courts in Illinois. There is, however, indication
that the privilege would apply regardless of that fact. In Ryan
the supreme court, after holding that the privileged relationship
existed between the client and both attorneys, stated: "We can
see no logical reason for a different result when a transcription
of the first confidential communication is transmitted with the
consent of the insured to the second attorney.' 2 3 0 There is no
reason for arguing that the corporate client would not be entitled to invoke the privilege as was invoked in Ryan by an individual client. In Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Construction
Co. 131 the Illinois Appellate Court clearly indicated that when
the employer who is not a member of the "control-group" makes
a communication to the attorney for the corporation such communication may be privileged from disclosure to the opposing
counsel when the employer is a defendant or may be a defendant
in the action. 13 2 This exception to the general rule withholding the
privilege from non-control control-group employees will have extended application in a great number of personal injury cases
where the only witness for the corporation is an employee who
may well be or become a defendant. This rule apparently would
not have changed the result of the Day case for there the occurrence witness was presumably not the employee who could
have defectively installed the gas pipe. The employees were
after-the-fact occurrence witnesses.
If however, the employee occurrence witness could not be
made a defendant in the action an argument could be made that
his statements made to counsel are protected against discovery.
If at the time the statements were made the attorney-client
privilege existed between the employee as an individual the
180 People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 461, 197 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1964).

This ap-

plication of the privilege is consistent with the stated rationale for affording
the privilege. See notes 68 and 69 supra. In People v. Ryan the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court which had assumed that there
was a privilege when there was a communication between a client and the
client's insurer, but had gone on to decide that privilege had been waived by
the retransmission to a third party. The Supreme Court in reversing the
appellate court held specifically that there was a privilege and that such
privilege was not waived. The Supreme Court noted that several other

states had held in accord with the appellate court's determination of the
privilege. Id. at 460, 197 N.E.2d at 17.
13' 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251 N.E.2d 314 (1969).
132 The court said:

We do not mean to imply that communications by an employee of a
corporation who does not come within the "control group" definition may
never be privileged. For example, the principle underlying the attorneyclient privilege would demand that an employee's communication should
be privileged when the employee of the defendant corporation is also a
defendant or is a person who may be charged with liability and makes
statements regarding facts with which he or his employer may be
charged, which statements are given or delivered to the attorney who
represents either or both of them.

Id. at 449-50, 251 N.E.2d at 318.
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privilege would protect the statements even though the employee
client were no longer subject to being made a defendant. The
privilege does not end with the termination of the action or the
relationship. 133
EXPERT'S REPORTS

134

Two problems are inherent in the discovery of the expert's
reports: the question of whether such are discoverable, and the
question of the procedure necessary to effectively promote
justice when discovery of expert's reports are sought. The
solutions have not been determined by Illinois law. Federal
cases give insight to the practitioner who must make an argument for his client's position. The federal decisions are
helpful even though in cases such as Monier v. Chamberlain15
the Illinois courts have expressed independence when they found
the federal rule disadvantageous.
Expert's reports must be subjected to the same analysis
as any other matter which is sought to be discovered. The
expert's report must be "relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action."'13 6 In order to be relevant such material must either be admissible into the trial as evidence or
lead to matter which is admissible into evidence. When the
relevancy is so remote that the practitioner fears that it might
not be discoverable; then perhaps, a strong argument that such
discovery would serve another purpose of discovery will aid
137
him.
It is impractical to categorize all expert's reports and then
to determine their discoverability as a group. Like any other
matter sought for discovery, they may be excluded if such
reports are entitled to either a privilege or an exemption. As
133 Wigmore says:

The subjective freedom of the client, which it is the purpose of the
privilege to secure, could not be attained if the client understood that,
when the relation ended or even after the client's death, the attorney
could be compelled to disclose the confidences, for there is no limit of
time beyond which the disclosures might not be used to the detriment of
the client or of his estate. It has therefore never been questioned, since
the domination of the modern theory, that the privilege continues even
after the end of the litigation or other occasion for legal advice and
even after the death of the client.
8 WIGMORE, §2323.
134 If the expert has relevant facts within his knowledge whether or not
such could be discovered might well turn upon how he acquired the relevant
facts. As to those facts which the expert acquires through his observation
he is an occurrence witness. As to the ultimate facts formed by his expertise
then this section will help the practitioner determine whether the report is
discoverable.
135 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966), where the court adopted the
federal rule for the definition of work-product but rejected the requirement
of good-cause making all that which did not involve the legal theory of the
litigation discoverable.
136 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (1) (1969).
137 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (1), 214 (1969).
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noted earlier, matters excludible from discovery are generally
grouped into three categories: work-product, attorney-client
privilege, and that excluded by the doctrine of unfairness. 138
The report of an expert may be relevant in a discovery sense, but
part or all of it may be non-discoverable for any one of the
mentioned reasons.

One commentator notes that the attorney-client privilege
can be applied to protect the expert's report only when such
expert is either a client or his necessary agent. 139 If, however,
a broader approach were taken, an argument could be made for
the application of the attorney-client privilege to other situations. One such approach relies upon the rationale supporting
the attorney-client privilege:
If the expert's reports to the attorney are not privileged, clients
will be less likely to hire the specialists and the latter will be less
likely to make full disclosure; rather they would tend to communicate only those facts
and opinions which would be favorable to
40
their client's case.'

Other writers have felt that the probability of this occurrence
41
is small.1
Other considerations must be made before it can be said if
the expert's report is discoverable. There are privileges other
than the attorney-client privilege. In 1959 Illinois created a

physician-patient privilege where none had existed at common
law. 1

The provisions of the act expressly exclude the invoca-

138 See notes 40-43 supra; Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal
Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 22, 53 (1968).
See text at
139 Such occurs in the attorney-corporate client situation.
note 63 supra.
140 Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 460 (1962).
Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv.
141 Comment, Developments in the Law 940, 1032 (1961), where it is said, "Nevertheless, if permitting discovery of
expert conclusions would discourage both parties from seeking them, it might
be appropriate to grant work-product protection in order to assure that the
litigants would not be deprived of expert assistance." It should be noted
here that this author feels that the protection afforded the expert's reports
should flow from the concepts normally called "work-product." Such "workproduct" considerations are different from attorney-client privilege considerations and if the two are confused different and incorrect results might well
occur. Of course, there is enough similarity between the two sets of concepts that there is both some overlapping and general confusion in the area.
It could be further said,
It is unlikely that the attorney would fail to employ an expert merely
because of his fear that an adverse report would be used against him.
It might be argued that since the attorney defines the scope of the expert's inquiry, a subjective element is introduced into the investigation
significant enough to invoke the qualified privilege of the Hickman
case.
Note, The Attorney's Trial Preparations& Pre-Trial Discovery Under the
Federal Rules: Hickman v. Taylor Two Years After, 62 HARv. L. REv. 269,
272 (1948).
142 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5.1. (1969).
The provisions are:
[N]o physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any informa-

19701

71houghts on Pretrial Discovery

tion of the privilege in a civil action wherein the mental or
physical condition of the patient is in issue. In 1963 the Illinois
General Assembly extended the medical privilege to the psychiatrist-patient relationship.141
This privilege was similarly
qualified to provide for the use of the psychiatrist as an expert.14 4 When a spiritual advisor qualifies as an expert, consideration must be given to the scope of the spiritual advisorcommunicant privilege. "1 5 Finally, there exists in Illinois a
privilege which can be invoked by an accountant. 1'"
Another significant factor is the purpose of the expert. The
work-product exemption should be applied to protect a communication with an expert where the attorney is arranging
available evidence and which reflects the attorney's legal expertise.-7 However, if the expert's report is to be used as
evidence, then such would fall outside the Monier definition of
work-product. 14 The federal courts show a divergence of view
in different districts."The third approach for analysis is the doctrine of unfairness. 150 Discovery of an expert's report could be denied if the
tion which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him professionally to serve such
patient, except only (1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide,
(2) in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for malpractice,
(3) with the expressed consent of the patient, or in case of his death
or disability, of his personal representative or other person authorized
to sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy
on his life, health, or physical condition, (4) in all civil suits brought by
or against the patient, his personal representative, a beneficiary under
a policy of insurance, or the executor or administrator of his estate
wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an issue, (5) upon
an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of the patient, (6) in
any criminal action where the charge is either murder by abortion, attempted abortion or abortion or (7) in actions, civil or criminal, arising
from the filing of a report in compliance with "An Act for the reporting
of certain cases of physical abuse, neglect or injury to children," enacted
by the Seventy-fourth General Assembly. (emphasis added).
143 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5.2 (1969).
144 There is no privilege under this Section for any relevant communications . . . (c)

in a civil or administrative proceeding in which

the patient introduced his mental condition as an element of his claim
or defense or, after the patient's death, when his mental condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the patient.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, §5.2 (1969).
145 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §48.1 (1969).
146 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §51 (1969).
147 Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 359-60, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416
(1966). One commentator has noted that language in Monier suggests that
experts' reports which are used to shape the mental processes of the attorney are discoverable. See Note, Discovery of Expert Information After
Monier v. Chamberlain, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 624, 632 (1967).
14Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 11. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
149 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684
(D. Mass. 1947) ; Cold Medal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
F.R.D. 425 (D. Ohio 1947); see Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal
Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 22, 51-52 (1968).

150 See text at notes 44-47 supra.
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order providing for discovery was conditioned upon an apportionment of the cost of the discovery, and the party seeking
discovery fails to remit an amount equal to his aliquot share
ordered by the court.15 ' There are further areas where the
Illinois trial courts under the authority granted by the supreme
court rules 1, 2 would have power to act. In addition to dividing
the costs of discovery of the expert's report, protective orders
could be entered to exclude those parts of the expert's reports
which would be subject to exemption or privilege and allow
discovery for the remaining relevant material.
The analysis of expert's reports thus completed does not
account for the problem that arises when the expert has not
written a report or when the written report consists of notes
taken by the attorney while in conference with the expert. If
the expert has observed facts which are relevant in a discovery
sense, he is subject to divulge such facts by deposition. 15 3 His
existence is discoverable by interrogatory. 5 If the expert has
been consulted by the attorney and the expert has not made
independent observations, it may be argued that he is being
used to shape the mental processes of the attorney. If the
expert's written reports consist of notes taken by the attorney
during a conference, these notes might well contain such mental
impressions of the attorney which would be within the Monier
definition of work-product. If such mental impressions of the
attorney can be separated from the remarks of the expert, a
protective order can be utilized to provide for the separation.
If separation is impossible, the notes should be exempt from
discovery (under the theory that once the material falls within
the work-product exemption the protection is absolute). There
is at least one other fact which is employed in the pretrial
motion court to determine whether the expert's report is exempt. If the expert is going to testify, his report is probably
discoverable1 55
After a determination that an expert's reports are subject to
T

151

"A number of courts have questioned the wisdom of adopting a rule

which would permit one party to utilize the adverse party's expert merely
upon agreeing to some fee-splitting arrangement." Friedenthal, Discovery
and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455,
483 (1962).
152 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§201 (c) (1), 214 (1969).
155 If an expert is a physician or surgeon an order of court is necessary
before he is subjected to a deposition. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §204 (a) (1)
(1969).
154 See Appendix for form orders and interrogatories.
155 See von Kalinowski, Use of Discovery Against the Expert Witness,
40 F.R.D. 43 (1967), wherein the commentator says:
There is a related area which seems to properly be a limitation on
the discovery of experts. This is a valid claim of a recognized privilege such as the attorney-client and the physician-patient privilege . ...
Suffice it to say for this purpose that if the privilege is a bar to dis-
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the rules applying to other discoverable material, the practical
problem of what procedure to follow arises. If counsel against

whom discovery is sought is required to produce the material in
court for a determination by the court as to whether it is privileged or exempt as he has urged, then the privilege or exemption is effectively destroyed. While in matters such as tradesecrets the court can enter a protective order directing the
moving party not to use the subject matter of the material
sought for discovery, when the matter is allegedly exempt because it divulges the opponent's trial plans, a protective order
could neither follow nor be enforced. The judge, of course,
may decide the question in camera. 156 If the moving party
disagrees with the judge's ruling, appeal can be had from it,
also in camera.
The post-Monier case of City of Chicago v. Albert J.
Schorsch Realty Co.1 7 should give the practitioner an indication of the direction that the Illinois courts are inclined to
follow as a result of the limitation on the work-product exemption. The case involved a condemnation proceeding of a vacant
piece of real estate. The defendant property owner sought by
interrogatory the list of all persons who were directed by the
board to inspect the property. A full answer to such would,
necessarily, include all those which the petitioner would employ
as expert appraisers. The trial court sustained the petitioner's
objection to the question. Petitioner's support was City of
covery it is a bar to testimony at trial as well. Thus, the privilege
should only be respected in the case where the expert is not going to
testify.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
156 Apparently this procedure is followed in some federal district courts,
see: von Kalinowski, Use of Discovery Against the Expert Witness, 40
F.R.D. 43 (1967), wherein the commentator remarks: "However, in some
districts the reports are first examined in camera to separate factual matters
from opinions." Id. at 44. A point is raised in the comments of the Model
Code of Evidence as adopted by the American Law Institute, which is pertinent to a discussion of the dissection between fact and opinion.
"Where a witness is attempting to communicate the impressions made
upon his senses by what he has perceived, any attempt to distinguish between so-called fact and opinion is likely to result in profitless quibbling.

Analytically no such distinction is possible."

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

rule

401, Comment (1942).
With regard to the observation of fact the analytical distinction between
fact and opinion is a question of the universality of the major premise. When
the observer received a retinal impression he applies such impression to a
pre-conceived standard. He may say, "I saw a book." He may say, "I saw
a drunk." Each of these is an impression applied to what a "book" or a
"drunk" is. If the standard is commonly accepted by men, then such observation is characterized in common language as a "fact." If the standard
is not commonly accepted by men, then such observation is likely to be
The problem arises in application of the
characterized as an "opinion."
concepts. When the intellectual sophistication increases there is a greater
likelihood that the listener will better understand the fact or opinion of the
witness.
157 95 Ill. App. 2d 264, 238 N.E.2d 426 (1968).
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Chicago v. Harrison-HalstedBuilding Corporation.15S The court
held, "that under the broad discovery principles of Monier v.
Chamberlain the names of appraisers are not privileged."' 159
The Schorsch court added that under the circumstances of the
case the error of the trial court was a harmless one.
The Schorsch case resolves only part of the questions involving the applicability of discovery to expert's reports. 60 The
thrust of the Monier decision was against the prior rule defining
work-product.)
The attorney-client privilege could not be fully
explored by the court because of the unusual circumstance that
both parties to the accident had the same insurer. The effect
of these facts raises the question as to whether the Schorsch
decision should be interpreted to be a limitation of only the
work-product doctrine on expert's reports. Probably Monier
should not be so tightly construed as to be limited to a holding
regarding work-product. Monier expressed a new judicial posture which the Illinois Supreme Court was taking. The Illinois
Appellate Court so recognized that posture in the Schorsch case
by referring to the "broad discovery principles of Monier v.
Chamberlain."""
CONCLUSION

For the practitioner who is attempting to resolve a problem
in pretrial discovery a further direction will be offered as a last
word. The issue to which a resolution is sought may be outside
the scope of this article or may be, when crystallized, a detail
which brevity required this article to exclude. If the practitioner
is able to find precedent on point he may quickly resolve his
problem. However, as mentioned earlier in this article, the
number of cases reviewing the rules are few, thus raising the
possibility, often encountered, that there are no cases resolving
his problem.
The practitioner might resolve his problem by an analysis
in light of the spirit of the rules. A statement of a spirit of a
law requires a verbalization of an almost visceral understanding
of the law reflective of the common consensus of justice. The
8 11 111. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40 (1957).
1.59
95 11. App. 2d 264, 279, 238 N.E.2d 426, 433 (1968). Accord Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Oberleander, 92 Il1. App. 2d 174, 235 N.E.2d
3 (1968).
160 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (1) (1969).

While citing the Schorsch case in attempting to analyze the problem,
and to come to a determination of whether experts' reports are discoverable,
one commentator has concluded: "At the moment neither conclusion can be
reached with any great degree of certainty, pending appeal and review."
Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC.
& PRoc. 22, 51 (1968).
161 Work product as defined by Monier is discussed in more detail in the
section of this article titled "Relevancy."
162 95 Ill.
App. 2d 264, 279, 238 N.E.2d 426, 433 (1968).
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practitioner must be cognizant of the effect of the developments
in that common consensus of justice upon the application of the
spirit of the law. The rules of pretrial discovery seek to permit
as free a disclosure of the facts pertinent to the case at bar as
can be reconciled with the competing rights and privileges recognized in law and possessed by the parties.
The practitioner must be aware of the fact that the theaters
of argument will develop around the balances of competing
rights and privileges of the parties. The degree of freedom
of the discovery allowable is limited only by the relevancy of
the material and the competing claims of right or privilege of
others. There seems to be little basis for an argument that
the breadth of discovery should be limited without reference to
a counter-balancing right or privilege.
The practitioner may well serve his cause if in preparing
his argument in an area in which case law has not provided
precedent, if he reconciles his argument with both the wording
of the rules and the spirit which that wording reflects.

APPENDIX
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
General No ....... L ----- v.
STANDARD APPROVED INTERROGATORIES
TO EACH PLAINTIFF IN PERSONAL
INJURY ACTION
1. State your full name; age, and address.
2. State the full name and address of each person who witnessed or
claims to have witnessed the occurrence alleged in your complaint.
3. State the full name and address of each Derson not named (in 2)
above who was present or claims to have been present at the scene
immediately before, at the time of or immediately after the occurrence.
4. Describe in general the personal injuries sustained by you as a
result of said occurrence.
5. With regard to said injuries, state:
a. The name and address of each attending physician,
b. The name and address of each consulting physician,
c. The name and address of each person or laboratory taking
an X-ray of you,
d. The date or inclusive dates on which each of them rendered
you service,
e. The amounts to date of their respective bills for services,
f. From which of them do you have written reports?
6. As the result of said personal injuries, were you a patient or an
out-patient in any hospital or clinic? If so, state the names and
addresses of each such hospital or clinic, the amounts of their
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respective bills and the date or inclusive dates of said services.
7.

As the result of said personal injuries, were you unable to work?
If so, state (a) the name and address of your employer, if any,
at said time, (b) the date or inclusive dates on which you were
unable to work, (c) the amount of wage or income loss claimed by
you, and (d) the name and address of your present employer if
any.

8.

Were you the owner of any vehicle involved in said occurrence? If
so, was said vehicle repaired and, if so, when, where and by whom
and what was the cost of said repairs.

9.

State any and all other expenses or losses'you claim as the result
of said occurrence.

10.

As a result of said occurrence were you made a defendant in any
criminal or traffic case? If so, state the court, the case number,
the charge or charges placed against you and whether you pleaded
guilty thereto.

11.

During the five years immediately prior to the date of said occurrence had you been confined in a hospital, treated by a physician
or X-rayed for any reason other than personal injury? If so, give
the name and address of each such hospital, physician, technician
or clinic, the approximate date of such confinement or service
and state, in general, the reason for such confinement or service.
Had you suffered any serious personal injury prior to the date of
said occurrence? If so, state when, where and in general how you
were so injured and describe in general the injuries suffered.
Have you suffered either (a) any personal injuries or (b) serious
illness, since the date of said occurrence? If so, for (a) state
when, where and in general the injuries suffered; and, for (b)
state when you were ill and describe in general the illness.
Have you ever filed any other suit for your own personal injuries?
If so, state the court in which filed, the year filed and the title and
docket number of said case.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Were the photographs taken of the scene of the occurrence or of
the persons or vehicles involved? If so, state the date or dates on
which such photographs were taken, the subjects thereof and who
now has custody of them.

16.

Do you have statements from any witness other than yourself? If
so, give the name and address of each such witness, the date of
said statement and state whether such statement was written or
oral.

17.

List the names and addresses of all other persons (other than
yourself and persons heretofore listed or specifically excluded) who
have knowledge of the facts of said occurrence or of the injuries
and damages following therefrom.

------------------------------------

Attorneys for
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
-

v. ------------- General No.

-

L

-

STANDARD APPROVED INTERROGATORIES
TO EACH DEFENDANT IN PERSONAL
INJURY ACTION

1.

State the name of the defendant answering and, if different, give
the full name and address of the individual signing the answers.

2.

State the full name and address of each person who witnessed the
occurrence alleged in the complaint.

3.

State the full name and address of each person not named (in 2)
above who was present or claims to have been present at the scene
immediately before, at the time of or immediately after said occurrence.

4.

Were you the owner or driver of any vehicle involved in said occurrence? If so, were you named or covered under any policy of
liability insurance effective on the date of said occurrence and, if
so, state the name of each such company, the policy number, the
effective period and the maximum liability limits for each person
and each occurrence.

5.

Were you the owner of any vehicle involved in said occurrence?
If so, was said vehicle repaired and, if so, when, and by whom and
what was the cost of said repairs?

6.

As a result of said occurrence were you made a defendant in any
criminal or traffic case? If so, state the court, the case number,
the charge or charges placed against you and whether you pleaded
guilty thereto.

7.

Do you have any information tending to indicate:
(a) That any plaintiff was, within the five years immediately
prior to said occurrence, confined in a hospital, treated by a
physician or X-rayed for any reason other than personal injury? If so, state each plaintiff so involved and give the
name and address of each such hospital, physician, technician or clinic, the approximate date of such confinement
or service and state, in general, the reason for such confinement or service.
(b) That any plaintiff had suffered serious personal injury prior
to the date of said occurrence? If so, state each plaintiff
so involved and state when, where and in general how he or
she was injured and describe in general the injuries suffered.
(c)

That any plaintiff has suffered either (a) any personal injury or (b) serious illness, since the date of the occurrence?
If so, state each plaintiff so involved and, for (a), state
when, where and in general how he or she was injured and
describe in general the injuries suffered; and for (b), state
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when he or she was ill and describe in general the illness.
(d) That any plaintiff has ever filed any other suit for his
or her own personal injuries? If so, state each plaintiff so
involved and give the court in which filed, the year filed
and the title and docket number of said case.
8.

Were any photographs taken of the scene of the occurrence or of
the persons or vehicles involved? If so, state the date or dates
on which such photographs were taken, the subjects thereof and
who now has custody of them.

9.

List the names and addresses of all other persons (other than
yourself and persons heretofore listed or specifically excluded) who
have knowledge of the facts of said occurrence or of the injuries
and damages following therefrom.

Attorneys for
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
v.

General No.......

L

SUPPLEMENTAL INTERROGATORIES
TO PLAINTIFF TO BRING DISCOVERY
UP TO DATE PRIOR TO TRIAL
1.

State the names and addresses of all persons, of whom you, your
, ...-..agents or attorney, have learned since
who, according to their statements at least:
a. Witness the occurrence specified in the complaint.
b. Were present at the scene immediately before or immediafter the occurrence specified in the complaint.

2.

State time off and earnings lost since said date due to the injuries
specified in the complaint.

3.

State the names and addresses of doctors who have, since said
date, treated you for injuries sustained in the occurrence specified
in the complaint and the amounts of their respective bills.

4.

State whether you have been personally injured in any accident
since said date; and, if so, give the approximate date and place of
said accident and describe, in general terms, the nature of the
injuries you sustained therein.

5.

Have you, since said date, been hospitalized; and, if so, give the
approximate dates of the same, the name and address of the hospital, and describe, in general terms, the reason for said hospitalization.

6.

State whether you, your agents or attorneys have, since said date,
taken or obtained (other than from another party under an order
of court) any photographs of the scene of occurrence or of the
instrumentality involved or any statement of the defendant on
whose behalf these interrogatories are propounded.

Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
-V.- -----------------

, General No.

L

ORDER FOR PRODUCTION
This cause coming on to be heard, upon due notice, on a motion to
produce documents, the court being full advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on a date and at a time to be
agreed upon but in any event within --- days from today, the parties
shall mutually produce, at the offices of the attorney ----------- for
the ------------ for inspection and copying, the following (together
with any transcripts, reports, memoranda or recordings purporting to
reflect but not to evaluate the same) :
(a) Where a party has given a statement to some person or
entity other than his attorney or insurer, said statement
shall be produced by the person or entity to whom it was
given or transferred.
(b) The statement of any other witness, except parties to this
action, non-treating experts and divers or other participants
who may yet be sued because of the occurrence alleged.
(c) All photographs, slides or motion pictures taken subsequent
to the alleged occurrence of the plaintiff
, the
vehicles or other physical objects involved or the scene of
the alleged occurrence.
(d) All data as to the physical or mental condition of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the alleged occurrence, including, inter alia, injuries sustained in other accidents.
(e) A list giving the names, addresses and specialties of all expert witnesses (other than non-treating, purely consultant
experts who are not to testify at the trial), omitting all
persons already listed above.
The word "party" shall, if an individual, also include members of
his immediate family, and shall, if a corporation, include its officers,
directors, managing agents and foreman. No party is, by this order,
required to disclose which witnesses (other than non-treating experts
who are not merely consultants) his attorney intends to use upon the
trial or the order or intended examination of such witnesses or his attorney's communications with such consultants.
This order assumes that the parties affected will ascertain and
allocate amongst themselves the expenses involved in initially securing
and reproducing the items to be produced. If such is not effectuated
amicably, this order contemplates further proceedings, as is also to be
the case if either party seeks to require the production of the report of
or to depose another's non-treating expert witness (not a mere consultant).
ENTER:

JUDGE

